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COMMENT 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAIR USE 
DEFENSE IN DR. SEUSS 
ENTERPRISES v. PENGUIN 
"Then our mother came in 
And she said to us two, 
"Did you have any fun? 
Tell me. What did you do?" 
And Sally and I did not know 
What to say. 
Should we tell her 
The things that went on there that day?"l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc} 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a copyright infringer was 
entitled to the affirmative defense of fair use.3 For a derivative 
use, such as a parody, fairness must be analyzed on a case-by-
1. DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT 60 (Random House 1957). 
2. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 22, 
1997) (No. 97-329) ("Seuss Ir). 
3. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399. To establish a prima facie case of copyright in-
fringement, the plaintiff must first show ownership of a valid copyright and, second, 
that there was copying of the original. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Seuss r). Defendant may then 
assert the affirmative defense of fair use. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1566. In claiming 
fair use, defendants admit the truth of plaintiifs claim of copyright infringement, but 
assert that their copying is exempt because of the application of the fair use defense. 
See id. 
1 
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case basis in light of the goals of copyright law.4 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Penguin could 
not claim the privilege of fair use of Dr. Seuss' copyrighted ma-
terial. 5 The court reached its conclusion after an analysis of 
the four statutory fair use factors, which included findings that 
the work was a satire, rather than a parody, and the work was 
not transformative.6 
Section II of this note sets forth the facts and procedural 
history of Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin, which is the most 
recent Ninth Circuit copyright decision presenting the affirma-
tive fair use defense. Section III provides a brief background of 
copyright law and the fair use defense. Section III also pres-
ents a historical view of the fact-sensitive, case-by-case analy-
sis of the four statutory fair use defense factors codified in 
17 U.S.C. § 107. Section IV examines the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin, focusing on Seuss En-
4. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994). The goal of 
copyright is to create public access to works of science and art by providing an economic 
. monopoly for the work's author, thus allowing that author to secure financial remu-
neration for hislher efforts for a limited amount of time. See Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v;Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
5. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. Fair use is considered the privilege to use 
someone else's copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without hislher consent, 
notwithstanding the monopoly granted by copyright ownership. See Rosemont Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399-1403. Section 107 
states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified in that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work. 
17 U.S. C. § 107. 
Parody is considered a form of satire, as are diatribe, narrative, and burlesque. See 
SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1400 n.7; Michael C. Albin, Essay, Beyond Fair Use: Putting Sat-
ire In Its Proper Place, 33 UCLA L. REV. 518 (1985). A secondary work is considered 
transformative if it does not supersede the original and is itself original through the 
addition of new expression, meaning or message. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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terprises' copyright infringement claim.7 Section V critically 
analyzes the Ninth Circuit's holding, focusing on the validity of 
the court's determination that the infringing work was not a 
parody, nor transformative. Section VI then briefly summa-
rizes the court's decision and its implications. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. ("Seuss Enterprises") owns most 
of the copyright and trademark rights to the family of works 
created by Theodor Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss.8 Dr. 
Seuss wrote 47 books, which have collectively sold more than 
35 million copies worldwide.9 His books entertain children 
through the use of playful rhymes and illustrations of fanciful 
creatures.IO The Cat in the Hat was originally published in 
1957.11 
In 1995, publishers Dove, Inc. announced the forthcoming 
book, The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, written 
by Alan Katz and Chris Wrinn.I2 Penguin Books USA was the 
book's distributor.I3 The Cat NOT in the Hat! tells the story of 
the Orenthal J. Simpson ("O.J. Simpson") double-murder 
trial. 14 Dove promoted the book to the publishing industry as 
"rhyming verse and sketches as witty as Theodore [sic] Geisel's 
7. See infra notes 17, 22· and accompanying text. 
8. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. cknied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1997) (No. 97-329) 
("Seuss Ir). 
9. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1396. 
10. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 
1561 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Seuss rJ. 
1\. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1396. 
12. See id. at 1396-97. 
13. See id. at 1396. The named defendants are Penguin Books USA, the distribu-
tor of the book; Dove, Inc., Dove II, Inc., and Michael Viner ("Dove"), the book's pub-
lishers; and Alan Katz and Chris Wrinn, the book's authors. &e Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. 
at 1561. The distributor, publisher, and authors will be referred to collectively as 
·Penguin." 
14. See Seuss 11,109 F.3d at 1397. 
3
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best. "16 The book featured illustrations that mimicked the dis-
tinctive style of Dr. Seuss' works.16 
Seuss Enterprises filed a complaint for copyright infringe-
ment and trademark infringement and dilution against Pen-
guin in the District Court for the Southern District 
California.17 At the same time, Seuss Enterprises requested a 
temporary restraining order and filed a motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent publication of The Cat NOT in the 
Hatt1S The district court denied the request for a temporary 
restraining order, but subsequently granted the preliminary 
injunction.19 The district court's order indicated there was a 
strong likelihood that substantial protected expression from 
The Cat in the Hat, Horton Hatches the Egg, and One Fish Two 
Fish Red Fish Blue Fish had been taken and that Penguin's 
fair use defense would not prevail at trial.20 At the time of the 
15. Id. In California u. Orenthal James Simpson, the defendant, O.J. Simpson, 
was charged with the double-murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman. See 
Christopher B. Mueller, Introduction: O.J. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System 
on Trial, 67 U. COL. R. 727 (1996). The trial lasted 252 days and was frequently re-
ferred to as the trial of the century because of the extensive media attention that sur-
rounded every aspect of the proceedings. See id. O.J. Simpson was acquitted of both 
murders after only five hours of jury deliberation. See id. 
16. See SeussI, 924 F. Supp at 1561. The Cat NOT in the Hat! appropriated the 
Cat's striped stovepipe hat, mischievous facial expression, and physical appearance. 
See id. at 1564. A caricature of O.J. Simpson, in the Cat's hat, with a recognizably 
similar expression, and posed like the Cat, appeared on the front and back covers as 
well as thirteen times in the text of the secondary work. See SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402; 
see also infra note 304. 
17. See Seu88 1, 924 F. Supp. at 1561-62. A claim for trademark infringement is 
concerned with a use of a mark that creates a likelihood of customer confusion over the 
source and origin of the goods or services. See Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1404. Trade dilu-
tion provides statutory protection against two kinds of harm: the whittling away of the 
distinctiveness of a famous trademark, and the tarnishing of a trademark and its asso-
ciated good will when the mark is used on inferior products or in unwholesome con-
texts. See Bruce P. Keller & David H. Bernstein, As Satiric As They Wanna Be: Parody 
Lawsuits Under Copyright, Trademark, Dilution and Publicity Laws, 416 PLIIPat 
1159, 1173 (1995). 
18. See Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1396. 
19. See id. at 1397. A temporary restraining order is a short term emergency rem-
edy which may be issued by the court without notice to the adverse party. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 65. Due to the possibly drastic consequences, the court prefers to hear the 
adverse party and determine whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate on the 
basis of both parties' positions. See id. 
20. See Seuss 1, 924 F. Supp. at 1562. The Copyright Act of 1976 extends copy-
right protection to original works of authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). It does not 
provide protection to any idea, concept, or principle. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Here, 
4
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district court's order, Penguin had already printed 12,000 cop-
ies of The Cat NOT in the Hatf1 
Penguin requested reconsideration of the district court's 
findings of facts and conclusions of law based on newly discov-
ered evidence and arguments reasonably omitted at the pre-
liminary injunction hearing.22 Upon reconsideration, the dis-
trict court maintained that the balance of hardships tipped 
markedly in the favor of Seuss Enterprises.23 Penguin ap-
pealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit.24 
III. BACKGROUND 
Conceptualized by the framers of our Constitution, a copy-
right is a means of encouraging creative efforts in both the arts 
and science.25 Copyright law's ultimate goal is to provide for 
Penguin correctly claimed that the typeface, poetic meter, whimsical style or visual 
style were not protectable copyright subject matter. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399. 
The district court, however, based its preliminary injunction on the cover illustrations 
and the use of the Cat's Hat, and not unprotectable copyright subject matter. See id. 
21. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1397. 
22. See Seuss 1,924 F. Supp. at 1562. Defendants provided an argument and evi-
dence that material used from the book "One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish" was 
not protectable expression. See Defso' Opening Br., at 7, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Pen-
guin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). Additionally, material 
used from Horton Hatches the Egg was a fair use. See id. Further, defendants argued 
that new information suggested a substantial amount of the Seuss artwork created 
between 1925 and 1937 had either entered the public domain or was owned by third 
parties, and therefore could not support an infringement claim. See id. 
23. See Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1575. The district court found that there was a 
strong likelihood of copyright infringement of The Cat in the Hat, but not from Horton 
Hatches an Egg or from One Fish Two Fish Blue Fish Red Fish. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d 
at 1397. The court expected Seuss Enterprises to defeat Penguin's claim offair use and 
found that the strong likelihood of success on the copyright claim established a pre-
sumption of irreparable harm. See id. Although the court saw a minimal likelihood of 
success on the dilution claim, it found there were serious questions for litigation re-
garding the claims for trademark infringement. See id. 
24. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1394. 
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Congress shall have Power ... to Promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. Copy-
right law is designed to "stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual 
enrichment of the public." Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward A Fair Use Stan-
dard, 103l1ARv. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990) [hereinafter Toward A Fair Use Standard]. 
5
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public access to the products of artists and scientists.26 Copy-
right law's intent is to motivate the creative activity of authors 
and inventors by providing a personal economic incentive to 
produce.27 As Justice Stewart recognized in Twentieth Century 
Music v. Aiken, "the immediate effect of our copyright law is to 
secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But the ul-
timate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good."28 These two ends are achieved by 
granting the author exclusive control over an original work for 
a limited time period, creating an economic monopoly.29 
Copyright exists in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.3o A copyright owner has exclu-
sive control over five rights: to reproduce the work, to prepare 
derivative works, to distribute the work, to perform the work, 
and to display the work.31 The limited time period for these 
exclusive rights is the term of the author's life plus fifty 
·years.32 
26. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
27. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
28. Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156. 
29. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). ·Copyright protection subsists, in accordance 
with this title, in original works of authorship fIXed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." ld. 
ld. 
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 106 states: 
[T)he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted 
work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of 
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly. 
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). ·Copyright in a work created on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsec-
tions, endures for a term consisting of the life of the ... author and fIfty years after the 
author's death." ld. Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act, the 1909 Act allowed for a 
term of 28 years, beginning with either publication or registration of an unpublished 
work. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). An additional 28 year renewal period is allowed. See id. 
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Copyright registration provides a public record of ownership 
and is a prerequisite to any claim of copyright infringement.33 
An action for copyright infringement requires a plaintiff to 
show ownership of a valid copyright and copying of the pro-
tected work.34 A court may find copying when substantial 
similarity exists between two works and the alleged infringer 
had some degree of access to the origina1.35 Alternatively, if the 
commonalities resulted from independent creation, the court 
may conclude that no copying occurred.3s An infringement will 
be recognized where the copying consists of the unlawful ap-
propriation of protected expression.37 
Notwithstanding the purpose of copyright, to stimulate 
creativity and dissemination of knowledge for the general pub-
lic good, it has sometimes been necessary to provide an oppor-
tunity for limited fair use of copyrighted materials.38 Fair use 
is the privilege to use an author's copyrighted material in a 
reasonable manner without the owner's consent.39 If fair use 
were not permitted, "excessively broad protection would stifle, 
rather than advance," copyright objectives for two reasons.40 
First, there are no wholly original thoughts; virtually all intel-
[d. 
33. See 17 u.s.c. § 411(a) (1994). Section 411(a) states: 
Except for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention 
works whose country of origin is not the United States and an action 
brought for a violation of the rights of an author under section 106A(a), 
and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no action for infringe-
ment of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration 
of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. 
34. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
35. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 
1565 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Seuss r). 
36. Seeid. 
37. See Sid & Marty KrofR Tel. Prods., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157, 
1165 (9th Cir. 1977). 
38. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109. 
39. See Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2nd Cir. 
1966). 
40. Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109. Although copyright law 
grants an author exclusive rights to exploit an original work, there is also concern that 
such protection does not operate to inhibit the exchange of ideas, a primary purpose of 
copyright law. See Debra L. Quentel, -Bad Artists Copy, Good Artists Steal-; The Ugly 
Conflict Between Copyright Law and Appropriationism, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 39, 48-49 
(1996). 
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lectual creativity is in part derivative.41 Second, important ar-
eas of intellectual activity, such as philosophy, criticism, and 
history, are explicitly referential and require continuous reex-
amination of previous expression.42 The fair use doctrine effec-
tuates the goals of copyright by protecting and legitimizing 
such "secondary" creativity.43 
Until the Copyright Act of 1976, fair use was solely a judi-
cially-created doctrine.44 With that Act, Congress introduced 
fair use as a statutory limitation on an author's exclusive 
rights.45 In enacting this limitation, Congress intended for the 
courts to continue their common law tradition of fair use adju-
dication.46 Congress left interpretation of the Act's text to the 
courts, by providing only general guidance, and did not intend 
to change, narrow, or enlarge the then-existing, judicially-
created doctrine.47 Instead, Congress enabled the courts to 
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute where the Act 
"would stifle the very creativity the law is designed to foster." 48 
Thus, a determination of a fair. use requires a case-by-case 
analysis of the statutory factors independently and, ultimately, 
weighed together.49 The four factors enumerated in § 107 of 
41. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109. As Justice Story 
explained, "[elvery book in literature, science, and art, borrows, and must necessarily 
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
575 (citing Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845». 
42. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109. Every advance in 
knowledge or art builds on prior work and is therefore referential per se. See Pierre N. 
Leva!, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 19, 22 (1994) [hereinafter Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Usel. 
43. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1110. 
44. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). In Folsom v. 
March, Justice Story delineated the inquiry for fair use as: "look to the nature and 
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede 
the objects, of the original work." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)). 
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
46. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976». 
47. See id. at 577-78. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
48. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State University Re-
search Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Co., 621 F.2d 57,60 (2nd Cir. 1980». 
49. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78. 
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the Act are: (1) the purpose and character of the secondary use; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used in the secondary work in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the 
secondary use upon the potential value for, or the value of, the 
copyrighted work.50 Prior case law illustrates how the courts 
have made determinations by relying on fact-sensitive consid-
erations to achieve policy-based decisions consistent with the 
goals of copyright. 51 
A. FIRST FACTOR: PuRPOSE AND CHARACTER OF USE 
In determining whether there has been a fair use, courts 
initially focus on the purpose of the use.52 The preamble to 
§ 107 provides examples of purposes that may be entitled to a 
claim of fair use.53 These examples include criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.54 The list of 
categories is neither exhaustive nor exclusive.55 On the other 
hand, a claim to one of the named purposes does not establish a 
presumption of fair use.56 Instead, a claim of fair use depends 
upon the analysis of all four factors, weighed together, in light 
. of the goals of copyright. 57 
A category not explicitly listed in the preamble to § 107 is 
parody.58 A parody is commonly defined as a "work that imi-
50. 17 u.s.c. § 107; see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
51. See Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1566. Although case-by-case analysis allows for 
consideration of a particular situation, it also fosters uncertainty. But see Quentel, 
supra note 40, at 52. 
52. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th 
Cir. 1997) ("Seussll") 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
54. See 17U.S.C. § 107. 
55. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399. The categories are merely examples 
of purposes entitled to fair use and provide only general guidance about the sorts of 
categories found to be fair use. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78. 
56. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581. 
57. See id. at 578. 
58. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107. Parody is a type of satire; satire includes dia-
tribe, narrative, parody and burlesque. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1400 n.7. Parodies 
are accorded protection as vehicles for facilitating political and social discourse. See 
Nels Jacobson, Faith Hope & Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 'Oh Pretty Woman,' and 
Parodists'Rights, 31 Rous. L. REV. 955, 1017 (1994). 
9
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tates the characteristic style of an author or work for comic ef-
fect or ridicule.OO9 Recognized as a form of criticism, parody 
contributes to the public benefit by providing social comment 
while creating a new work.6o Parody achieves its status as so-
cial commentary by disparaging the original work, however 
slightly, by "pointing out faults, revealing hidden affectations, 
emphasizing weaknesses, and diminishing strengths.~l 
Recently, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Su-
preme Court recognized that an author may claim fair use for a 
parody, like other comment or criticism.62 In Campbell, the 
Court held that the parodist must use elements of the prior 
work to create a new work that, at least in part, comments on 
the prior author's work.63 Parody mimics an original to make 
its point and, thus, has some claim to use another's creative 
expression.64 The Court differentiated satire from parody, indi-
cating that a satire need not have any critical bearing on the 
substance or style of an original work.65 Satire, therefore, 
stands "on its own two feet" and requires full justification for 
any borrowing from another author's work.66 
Whether an infringing work comments on the style or sub-
stance of an original work is a subjective determination left to 
the broad discretion of the courtS.67 The court must first dis-
cern what an original work represents and then what comment 
an infringing work may be making about the original.68 
Whether a parody is in good taste or bad taste should not be 
59. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1317 (3d 
ed.1992». 
60. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
61. Harriet K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, 
and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B. U. L. REV. 923, 953 (1985). 
62. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
63. See id. at 580. 
64. See id. at 580-81. 
65. See id. A satire is a creative work that relies on humor, irony, derision or wit 
to comment on society at large. See id. at 581 n.15. 
66. Campi1ell, 510 U.S. at 581. 
67. See Kathryn D. Piele, Three Years After Campbell u. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.: 
What Is Fair Game for Parodists?, 18 LoY. LA ENT. L.J. 75,98 (1997). 
68. See id. 
10
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relevant to a court's analysis of fair use.69 AB Justice Holmes 
explained in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing CO.,70 out-
side of the most narrow limits, it would be dangerous to have 
persons educated only in the law evaluate the worth of a crea-
tive work.71 
Whether the infringer copied the original in good faith or for 
a commercial interest may contribute to the court's under-
standing of the context of the infringement.72 Any aspect of the 
infringer's conduct, including whether the infringer acknowl-
edged the copyright owner or whether the infringer sought 
permission, can be considered.73 Acknowledgment of a source, 
however, does not excuse infringement when other § 107 fac-
tors are present.74 Additionally when the second work is a par-
ody, the parodist is neither expected to seek nor obtain the 
copyright holder's permission.75 Understandably, few authors 
would grant permission to have their character or their work 
mocked.76 
AB part of its analysis under the first factor, a court consid-
ers whether the character of the use is of a commercial nature 
or is for a nonprofit educational purpose; whether the use was 
productive; and whether the alleged infringer's conduct was 
proper.77 The character of the use is of considerable impor-
tance, specifically whether the user would profit from the use of 
the copyrighted material without paying the customary price 
for the use.78 The fact that an infringement itself may be con-
sidered commercial, as opposed to nonprofit, weighs against 
69. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582. 
70. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
71. See id. In Campbell, the Supreme Court provided only a few lines of dicta on 
the issue of cultural bias, simply reiterating the rule introduced in Bleistein v. Donald-
son Lithographing. See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1015. 
72. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
73. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171,1175-76 (9th Cir. 1992). 
74. See id. at 1176 n.8. . 
75. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986). 
76. See id. 
77. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D. Mass. 1993). 
78. See Harper & Row Publ'g, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
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fair ~e. 79 In Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios,80 the Supreme 
Court recognized a presumption against fair use when the in-
fringing use was based on commercial objectives.s1 Several 
years later, in Campbell, the Court held that the commercial 
character of a use does not, by itself, bar a finding of fair use.S2 
Under the first factor, courts also consider whether the in-
fringing use is transformative.83 In Folsom v. Marsh, Justice 
Story defined a new work as transformative if it did not super-
sede or serve as a market substitute for the original work.84 In 
Campbell, the Supreme Court expanded on Justice Story's 
definition of "transformative," adopting Justice Leval's inter-
pretation, and indicated that a work would be considered trans-
formative if the secondary work added "something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message. n85 When considering 
whether a work is transformative, the Ninth Circuit has as-
sessed whether the purpose for the infringer's use of the copied 
material is the same as the intrinsic purpose intended by the 
copyright owner.86 When an infringing use is not transforma-
tive, it would more than likely supersede the original and mar-
ket substitution would be more certain.S7 A transformative use 
is neither necessary for a finding of fair use, nor is it dispositive 
in a fair use determination.88 Instead, courts will consider the 
degree to which a secondary work is transformed, and the more 
79. See id. 
80. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
81. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449. In Sony, the infringing use involved non-
commercial reproduction of television shows for re-broadcasting at a later time. See id. 
at 417. 
82. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
83. See id. at 579. 
84. See id. (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D: Mass. 1841)). 
85. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Pierre Leval, Toward a Standard of Fair 
Use, supra note 25, at 1111). 
86. See Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1175. 
87. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. Market substitution occurs when the infring-
ing use would be considered a replacement for the original copyrighted work. See id. A 
finding that an infringing use superseded the original would impact the court's analy-
sis under the fourth factor, where an effect on the market could be presumed because a 
superseding use equates with market substitution. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
88. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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transformative it is, the less other factors, such as commer-
cialism, will weigh into the fair use analysis.89 
B. SECOND FACTOR: NATURE OF COPYRIGHTED WORK 
In considering the nature of the work, the court recognizes 
that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright 
protection than others.90 To be copyrightable under § 102, a 
work must be an original work of authorship.91 In Feist v. Ru-
ral Telephone, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional 
requirement for minimal creativity in addition to independent 
creation.92 Originality is, therefore, a threshold requirement 
for copyright protection.93 As compared to factual works, crea-
tive expression falls closer to the core of copyright protection.94 
Typically, a fmding of fair use is more likely when the nature of 
the copyrighted work is factual rather than fictional or crea-
tive.95 In general, this second factor is much more important 
when analyzing a work that does not claim to be social com-
mentary, such as parody.96 Specifically, when considering a 
parodic infringement, this factor is less important because 
parodies invariably copy publicly-known, expressive works.97 
C. THIRD FACTOR: AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY 
Under the third factor, courts analyze the quantity and the 
substantiality of the original work used in the infringing 
work.98 The first relevant consideration is whether a signifi-
cant portion of the infringing work was copied from a protected 
work.99 Although a significant amount of copying weighs 
89. See id. 
90. See id. at 586. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
92. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362. 
93. See id. at 351. 
94. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 237-38 
(1990». 
95. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990). 
96. See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1006. 
97. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
98. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. 
99. See id. 
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against a fmding of fair use, taking a lesser portion of the copy-
righted work will not necessarily be excused.loo Generally, the 
inquiry under this factor is intertwined with that of the first 
factor because courts recognize that the extent of permissible 
copying will vary with the purpose and character of the use.IOI 
Next, courts consider the substantiality of the copying.l02 
The concern is whether the infringer took the "heart" of the 
original work. loa In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter-
prises, the infringer copied passages from President Gerald 
Ford's manuscript for his forthcoming book, A Time To Heal. 104 
The Supreme Court held that even though the number of words 
quoted did not represent a large portion of the original work, 
the copied passages "qualitatively embodied [the] distinctive 
expression" ofthe work.lo5 
Courts also examine whether a substantial portion of a 
copyrighted work was copied verbatim.loo Exact copying dem-
onstrates the quality of the copied material, both to the original 
author and to the infringer, who seeks to profit from the origi-
nal author's copyrighted expression.I07 Verbatim copying may 
make a quantitatively small infringing use qualitatively 
great.IOB 
Use of some characteristic features of the original work in a 
parody cannot be avoided because both parody's humor and 
social comment derive from the public's recognition of the 
100. See id. at 565. 
101. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87. In Campbell, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case, in part, to determine whether appropriation of the original song's classic bass 
line was excessive copying. See id. at 589. 
102. See id. at 587. 
103. See id. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court considered the infringement of 
the Umost powerful passages" as essentially taking the "heart" of the original work. 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
104. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542. 
105. 1d. at 564-65. 
106. See id. at 565. 
107. See id. 
108. See Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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original's most distinctive or memorable features.109 When a 
parody targets a particular work, the parody must be able to 
"conjure up" at least enough of the original so the parodist can 
be certain the audience will recognize it.110 Courts have af-
forded parodists substantial latitude in the amount of copying 
allowed.lll Although an infringer must take enough to assure 
identification of the copyrighted work, how much more the in-
fringer can reasonably take will depend on the degree to which 
the new work's overriding purpose is to parody the original.l12 
To be sure, if an infringer borrows so much that it becomes 
likely the parody will serve as a market substitute for the 
original, the quantity of the use is unreasonable.113 
Thus, the facts bearing upon the third factor, amount and 
substantiality, are also relevant to the analysis of the fourth 
factor. 114 They assist in determining the extent to which the 
parody serves as a market substitute for the original or its de-
rivatives.1l5 A finding of market substitution may establish an 
inference of market harm. us 
D. FOURTH FACTOR: EFFECT ON THE MARKET 
An analysis of the fourth factor examines the extent of the 
market harm caused by the infringement.l17 As the essence of 
copyright protection provides an· economic incentive to the 
author, it is critical that the market for the original not be di-
minished.us Many courts have indicated that the fourth factor 
is "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
109. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
110. See id. 
111. See generally Koons, 960 F.2d at 311. 
112. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. The Court indicates that the lower limit of 
what is considered reasonable is established by an audience's recognition of the origi-
nal and recognizes that use of characteristic features is required to accomplish that 
goal. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. at 587. 
115. See id. 
116. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
118. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. 
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use."1l9 Courts reach this conclusion despite the lack of statu-
tory direction on the matter.120 The absence of any language to 
the contrary may suggest the factors should be balanced 
equally, but courts have, in fact, placed a greater weight on this 
factor. 121 
Market harm may be found when unrestricted and wide-
spread conduct, of the same sort as the infringement under 
consideration, would have an adverse impact on the potential 
market for the original.122 In deciding whether the original 
work has been harmed, courts focus on whether the infringing 
use diminishes the potential sale of the original work, whether 
it fulfills the demand for the original work by acting as a mar-
ket substitute, or whether it interferes with the marketability 
of the original work.l23 
Fair use, an affirmative defense, requires that the infringer 
carry the burden of demonstrating evidence about the relevant 
markets, including the market for derivatives.l24 Market harm 
may be found upon a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
119. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
120. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107. The 
statutory language of § 107 does not indicate how each of the four factors should be 
weighted. [d. The observation that the fourth statutory factor "is undoubtedly the 
single most important factor" was only dicta in the Harper & Row opinion. See Pierre 
Leva!, Essay, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 U.C.L.A L. REV. 1449, 1459 
(1997). Leval recognizes the fourth factor as significant, but indicates that even where 
a secondary use does not harm the market, that infringing use may still not be justified 
as a fair use. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1124. The fourth 
factor does not overshadow the requirement of justification under the flrBt factor. See 
id. 
121. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107; supra text accompanying note 6. Each factor di-
rects the court to deliberate on a different facet of the issue. See Toward A Fair Use 
Standard, supra note 25, at 1110. Justice Leval indicates that "the factors do not rep-
resent a score card that promises victory to the winner of the majority." [d. Instead, 
§ 107 directs the court to examine all of the facts and to consider whether a finding of 
fair use would serve the goals of copyright. See id. 
122. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
123. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
124. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. In Campbell, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case, in part, to provide the parties an opportunity to produce evidence concerning 
the effect on the market for a non-parodic rap version of 'Oh, Pretty Woman.' See id. at 
593. 
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dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists, 
which would tend to diminish or prejudice the sales of the 
original or derivative works.125 To successfully challenge a fair 
use defense, a plaintiff need only show that if the infringing 
use became widespread, it would adversely affect the potential 
market for the copyrighted work.126 In Sony Corp. v. Universal 
Studios, the Supreme Court held that non-commercial repro-
duction of television shows by use of home video cassette taping 
did not have a demonstrable effect upon the potential market 
for, or the value of, the copyrighted shows.127 The Court's deci-
sion turned on the fact that the infringing use had been for a 
personal purpose, time shifting to enable the home viewer to 
watch a show at a later time, rather than for a commercial 
purpose. l28 In addition, because the use was non-commercial 
and personal, the Court recognized that prohibition of such re-
production would not protect the author's incentive to create.l29 
Thus, when the copy does not compete with the original, the 
courts are not concerned about undercutting the demand and 
discouraging creativity.130 
Courts have acknowledged that, realistically, parodists will 
seldom receive permission from the owners of an original work 
to create a critical review or to caricature the work.l31 In the 
context of fair use, the inability to secure permission to use 
copyrighted material in exchange for consideration, financial or 
otherwise, constitutes market failure.132 Market failure com-
monly occurs where an author attempts or proposes to ridicule 
125. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451. Actual harm need not be shown, nor must 
there even be a showing that future harm will result with certainty. See id. 
126. See id. 
127. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450. 
128. See id. at 450-53. 
129. See id. 
130. See Hustler, 796 F.2d at 1156. 
131. See Leibowitz v. Paramount, 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Accord 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432, 
437 (9th Cir. 1986). 
132. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1602 
(1982). Market failure is impliedly different from market harm, which involves an 
adverse impact on the market for the original. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
591-92. 
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another author because the original author's "[s]elf-esteem is 
seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permission 
even in exchange for a reasonable fee. "133 The fair use defense 
exists to allow certain uses, such as parody, which likely cannot 
be purchased.134 In part, the fair use privilege, including its 
application to a parodic infringement, exists to advance and 
disseminate culture and knowledge.135 
A finding of a commercial purpose, under the first factor, is 
indicative of, although not dispositive of, market harm.13S In 
Sony, the Supreme Court held that a commercial purpose un-
der the first factor created a presumption against a finding of 
fair use.137 The Campbell Court then narrowly construed the 
Sony holding, finding no presumption in a situation involving 
something beyond mere duplication for commercial purposes.l38 
The Court reasoned that verbatim copying for a commercial use 
clearly serves as a market substitute for the original.139 Con-
sequently, in evaluating the impact of the commercial purpose, 
a court must consider whether such a purpose interferes with 
the author's incentive to create, thus compromising the goals of 
copyright law.140 
In contrast, when the infringing use is transformative, 
"market substitution is ... less certain and market harm may 
not be so readily inferred. "141 As a parody, the new work will 
not likely affect the value of the original in a cognizable man-
ner, by acting as a substitute for it, simply because the parody 
and the original rarely serve the same market functions.142 An 
133. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437. 
134. See id. 
135. See Gordon, supra note 132, at 1602. The fair use aflIrmative defense grants 
the privilege to use a creator's copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without 
the author's consent. See Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 
306 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
136. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91. 
137. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451. 
138. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. 
139. See id. 
140. See generally Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156. 
141. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. 
142. See id. 
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illustrative case is Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, 
Inc., in which Jerry Falwell mass reproduced a parody piece 
about him, which was originally published in Hustler, a well-
known pornographic magazine.143 Falwell's purpose was three-
fold: to rebut Hustler's personal attack; to make a political 
comment on pornography; and to solicit funds for his 
ministry.l44 Clearly Falwell's audience was different from Hus-
tler's audience.145 In addition, the "commercial" purposes of 
each use differed: Hustler used the parody in a for-profit con-
text, while Falwell's use served a non-profit purpose.l46 As a 
result, the Ninth Circuit found Falwell's reproduction a fair 
use.147 
It is conceivable that a parody may harm the original work's 
market, just as a scathing review may suppress demand for a 
book, movie, or theatrical production.l48 Courts differentiate, 
however, between remediable displacement, copyright in-
fringement that usurps the original, and unremediable dispar-
agement, biting criticism that merely suppresses demand for 
the original.149 Market substitution is indicative of market 
harm and suggests remediable displacement, such that the 
copyright holder should be afforded a legal remedy.150 
Courts recognize, however, that a parody may simply be a 
form of unremediable disparagement, making its parodic point 
by criticizing or commenting on another work.l5l Courts reason 
that, by employing distortion and exaggeration and evoking 
amusement, derision, or scorn, a parody results in a form of 
disparagement that does not necessarily entitle an author to a 
remedy.152 It is not relevant under copyright law that a parody 
143. See Hustler, 796 F. 2d at 1149-50. 
144. See id. at 1153. 
145. See id. at 1150, 1156. 
146. See id. at 1156. 
147. See id. 
148. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92. 
149. See id. at 592. 
150. See id. 
151. Dorsen, supra note 61, at 952. 
152. See id. at 952-53. 
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may impair the market for the original or its derivative works 
through the effect of its critical commentary.l53 Such impair-
ment is not market harm, but merely constitutes unremediable 
disparagement. 154 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Penguin appealed the district court's grant of a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting the publication of The Cat NOT in the 
Hat!15S The Ninth Circuit then reviewed whether Seuss Enter-
prises had made a sufficient showing of copyright infringement, 
and if so, whether that infringement constituted a fair use.15S 
A. PuRPoSE AND CHARACTER OF USE 
The court first evaluated whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! 
had a purpose and character that satisfied the meaning of 
§ 107.157 In accordance with Campbell, the Ninth Circuit began 
by thoroughly deliberating the purpose of the infringement and 
considering whether the work was a parody.l58 The court rec-
ognized that, under Campbell, in order to be considered a fair 
use, The Cat NOT in the Hat! must be a parody rather than a 
153. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593. 
154. See id. at 592-93. If, however, there is substantial goodwill associated with a 
famous trademark, disparagement may be remediable under a claim of dilution if the 
parody tarnishes the trademark by portraying it in an unwholesome or unsavory way. 
See Leslie J. Lott and Brett M. Hutton, Trademark Parody, 489 PLIIPat 517, 528 
(1997). 
155. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1997) (No. 97-329) 
(MSeuss Ir) The district court granted the preliminary injunction on the basis that 
Seuss Enterprises demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright 
infringement claim and that the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of Seuss 
Enterprises. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 
1575 (S.D. Cal. 1996). (MSeuss r) 
156. See Seu88 II, 109 F.3d at 1397. Penguin's request for reconsideration pre-
sented the Ninth Circuit with a number of questions about the lower court's decision. 
See Defs.' Opening Br., at 2, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 
1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). First, Penguin contended the district court erred 
by preliminarily enjoining publication of the book. See id. Second, Penguin asserted 
the scope of the district court's preliminary injunction was overbroad in that it enjoined 
non-infringing material. See id. 
157. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
158. See generally SeusslI, 109 F.3d at 1399-1400. 
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satire.159 To be recognized as a parody, the new work must at 
least, in part, comment on the original author's work.1so The 
court discussed Rogers v. Koons, in which the Second Circuit 
emphasized that the original work must be the target, in part, 
of the parody, otherwise the new work is only a satire.l61 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, found the standard expressed in Jus-
tice Kennedy's Campbell concurrence more persuasive.l62 Jus-
tice Kennedy stated that "the parody must target the original, 
and not just its general style, the genre of art to which it be-
longs, or society as a whole (although if it targets the original, 
it may target those features as well). »163 This more restrictive 
standard requires that a parody target both the style and the 
substance of an original.l64 
The Ninth Circuit found that neither the substance nor the 
content of The Cat in the Hat was conjured up by the infringing 
work's focus on the Brown and Goldman murders and the O.J. 
Simpson trial.l65 The Ninth Circuit examined various portions 
159. See id. at 1400-01. 
160. See id. In parody, the copyrighted work is the target, whereas in satire, the 
copyrighted work is merely a vehicle to poke fun at another target. See id. at 1400. 
Courts do not recognize the fair use defense for a satire. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394 
(9th Cir. 1997) (infringing book was only satire and may not be afforded latitude in fair 
use defense); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310, 312 (2nd Cir. 1992) (infringing sculp-
ture not entitled to fair use defense because only commented on materialistic society 
and not the original photograph); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (1956), affd Co-
lumbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (holding burlesque, a form of 
satire, not defensible on grounds affair use). 
161. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400-01. For a parody to be recognized as such, the 
Second Circuit required that the audience must recognize an original and separate 
expression attributable to a different author. See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310. 
162. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400. Justice Kennedy's concurrence pro-
vides that a secondary work made for profit, no matter how transformative, is not a fair 
use unless it displays a parodic character. See Roxana Badin, An Appropriate(d) Place 
in Transformative Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion form Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (1995). 
163. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597). (emphasis 
added). Besides requiring that a parody target the original work's style and substance, 
Justice Kennedy also "cautioned against allowing copiers to claim parody status as an 
afterthought." See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 992. 
164. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 597 (1994). 
165. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401. 
21
Shapiro: Fair Use Defense
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
22 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1 
of The Cat NOT in the Hat! and concluded that it was not a 
parody, but simply a retelling of the Simpson tale.l66 
The first two pages focus on Los Angeles, California, specifi-
cally Brentwood, the site of the two brutal murders.167 The 
following section mimics Dr. Seuss' poem "One Fish Two Fish 
Red Fish Blue Fish" with the stanza "One Knife? Two Knife? 
Red Knife Dead Wife. "168 The next eighteen pages detail Simp-
son's trip to Chicago, the noise outside Kato Kaelin's room, the 
bloody glove found by detective Mark Fuhrman, the Bronco 
automobile chase, the Dream Team of lawyers, the jury selec-
tion, the DNA evidence and more.169 
The court concluded that the infringing work broadly mim-
icked Dr. Seuss' characteristic style, but it did not ridicule that 
style.170 The court noted that Penguin's use of the Cat's stove-
pipe hat, Dr. Juice as a narrator, and a title similar to the 
original's title were all means of drawing attention to the new 
work, perhaps "to avoid the drudgery in working up something 
fresh."171 
Finally, with regard to the purpose and character of use, the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! 
merely superseded the Dr. Seuss originals or whether it "trans-
formed" those works.172 The court did not recognize any effort 
to create a transformative work.173 As a result, under the first 
factor, the court concluded the scale tipped against fair use be-
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. Seeid. 
170. See Seu88 II, 109 F.3d at 1401. 
171. ld. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580). 
172. See Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1400. A work is "transformative" if it adds newex-
pression, meaning or message. See id. 
173. See id. at 1401. 
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cause the infringing work was neither a parody nor transfor-
mative. I74 
B. NATURE OF COPYRIGHTED WORK 
The second factor requires that the court consider the na-
ture of the original copyrighted work.175 Creative works are 
generally afforded the highest level of protection in a claim of 
copyright infringement.176 The Ninth Circuit recognized that 
the original work, The Cat in the Hat, embodied significant 
creativity, imagination, and originality.I77 Consistent with 
prior case analysis on this factor, the court did not find this 
factor to be significant in the fair use determination.I78 Never-
theless, the court concluded that the second factor also tilted 
the scale against fair use.179 
C. AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY 
Under the third factor, the Ninth Circuit questioned 
whether the amount and substantiality of the portion of the 
original used, in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, 
was reasonable in light of the purpose for the copying.lSO First, 
when considering the quality of the appropriation, the Ninth 
Circuit indicated that this factor raised the question of sub-
stantial similarity rather than fair use.l8l The court had previ-
ously discussed substantial similarity when it considered 
whether there was an infringement of Seuss Enterprises' copy-
right. 182 The Ninth Circuit emphasized Penguin's appropria-
174. See id. The district court considered both parody and satire as transformative 
and indicated that neither posed a threat of displacing the demand for the original 
work. See SeussI, 924 F. Supp. at 1568. 
175. See 17 U,S.C. § 107 (2); supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
176. See Seuss11, 109 F.3d at 1402 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586). 
177. See SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. 
182. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1402. In considering whether there was a copyright 
infringement, the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether Seuss Enterprises had demon-
strated substantial similarity. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1398. The court applied a 
version of the two part test presented in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. 
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tion of the Cat's image, the copying of the Cat's hat, and the 
multiple uses of the image on the front and back covers and in 
the text as evidence ofinfringement.l83 Reflecting on the quali-
tative nature of the copying, the court concluded that the Cat's 
image represented the "highly expressive core" of Dr. Seuss' 
work. 184 
Second, in examining the quantity of the appropriation, the 
Ninth Circuit considered the extent of permissible copying rela-
tive to the purpose and character of the use.l85 When courts 
recognize an infringing work as a parody, there is substantial 
latitude in the amount of copying allowed.l86 Despite its previ-
ous determination that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not a 
parody, the Ninth Circuit reexamined the issue.187 
Katz and Wrinn, the authors of The Cat NOT in the Hat!, 
argued that they selected The Cat in the Hat as the vehicle for 
their parody because the two stories were similar.l88 Specifi-
cally, the authors pointed out that the main characters of each 
tale, the Cat and O.J. Simpson, each committed acts contrary 
to moral authority and both stories end with a significant 
moral dilemma.189 In The Cat in the Hat, the children must 
decide whether to tell their mother about the Cat's visit.l90 In 
The Cat NOT in the Hat!, Penguin maintained that a similar 
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). See id. at 1398. The test inquires 
first whether the works are substantially similar in both idea and expression, and 
second whether an audience of reasonable persons would perceive substantial similari-
ties between the infringing work and the protected expression of the original work. See 
id. 
183. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1402. The image was used thirteen separate times. 
See id. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. The extent of permissible copying is evaluated based on the persua-
siveness of the parodist'sjustification for the copying. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
186. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87. 
187. See SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402-03. 
188. See id. at 1402. 
189. See id. 
190. Seeid. 
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moral dilemma existed, concerning the revelation of the actual 
murderer's identity.191 
Penguin argued that its work was a commentary on the 
events surrounding the Brown and Goldman murders.l92 By 
evoking the world of The Cat in the Hat, the authors felt they 
could "comment on the mix of frivolousness and moral gravity 
ijuxtaposed by] the culture's reaction to the events surrounding 
the ... murders."193 Moreover, the authors relied on Dr. Seuss' 
combination of whimsy and moral dilemma to recall The Cat in 
the Hat, where a trickster Cat created "mayhem along with his 
friends, Thing One and Thing Two, and then magically 
clean[ed] it up ... leaving a moral dilemma in his wake."l94 
Similarly, The Cat NOT in the Hat! presented a scenario in 
which the trickster O.J. Simpson created mayhem that his 
friends, Kato Kaelin and Simpson's Dream Team of lawyers 
magically cleaned up, leaving a moral dilemma about the iden-
tity of the murderer.195 The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed 
with the lower court's characterization of Penguin's claim to 
fair use as "purely schtick," stating Penguin's post-hoc charac-
terization of the work as a parody was "completely unconvinc-
ing."l96 Thus, the court's finding under the third factor also 
weighed against fair use.l97 
D. EFFECT ON THE MARKET 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned its attention to the fourth 
factor, and evaluated the extent of market harm that publica-
191. See id. 
192. See Seu88 II, 109 F.~ at 1402. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 1402-03. 
195. See id. 
196. Id. at 1403. The lower court compared the parodic nature of Th£ Cat NOT in 
th£ Hat! to the parodic nature of the secondary use in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 
569 (1994), Fish£r v. Dee8, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986), and Elsmere Music v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1980). See SeU88 I, 924 F. Supp. at 1569. The 
district court found no similar attempt to comment on the text or themes of Th£ Cat in 
th£ Hat. See id. The court found Penguin's assertion that The Cat NOT in th£ Hatf 
achieved its status as parody by "suggesting limits to the Seussian imagination" to be 
inadequate and unconvincing. Id. 
197. See Seussll, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
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tion and distribution of The Cat NOT in the Hat! would 
cause.19B The court fIrst considered whether unrestricted and 
widespread dissemination of the infringing work would harm 
the potential market for the original and its derivatives.l99 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that substantial good will and 
reputation is associated with Dr. Seuss' works.2OO Based on its 
prior conclusion that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was non-
transformative and commercial, the court inferred market 
harm because market substitution was more certain.201 
In addition, Penguin failed to demonstrate any evidence re-
garding the relevant markets.202 Relying on Campbell, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that it could not analyze the fourth 
factor, but could only recognize that a silent record on a such 
an important fair use factor "disentitle[s] the proponent to the 
defense. "203 
In light of its fair use analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that 
this fourth factor, along with factors one, two and three, 
weighed against a fInding of fair use.204 Consequently, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunc-
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. See id. 
201. See id. The district court was less willing to infer market harm. See Seus8 I, 
924 F.Supp. at 1568. The district court found that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was only 
satire, but indicated that both parody and satire were transformative works. See id. As 
a transformative work, the court stated it did not seem likely that the new work would 
displace demand for the original. See id. The district court also discussed an original 
author's likely reluctance to license parodies, relying on Fisher v. Dee8. See id. The 
court concluded that since a parodist seldom gets permission, a parodist is "presumed 
to operate within a market imperfection." Id. 
202. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
203. Id. at 1403 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94). In Campbell, the defen-
dants submitted uncontroverted evidence that there was no likely effect on the market 
for the original. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. The defendants failed, however, to 
address the market for derivatives. See id. The Supreme Court recognized that the 
defendants' lack of evidence on the market effect on derivatives did not necessitate a 
conclusion of market effect. See id. The Court remanded the case for further proceed-
ings with an expectation that "the evidentiary hole will doubtless be plugged upon 
remand." Id. at 594. 
204. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
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tion, thus prohibiting Penguin from distributing or marketing 
The Cat NOT in the HatP05 
v. CRITIQUE 
In Seuss Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit narrowly interpreted 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music206 and produced a result that is 
inconsistent with that decision, as well as prior Ninth Circuit 
jurisprudence.207 First, while examining the purpose and char-
acter of the infringing use, the Ninth Circuit found that parody 
was not the purpose of The Cat NOT in the HatfOS The court 
found that the work only targeted society in general, rather 
than The Cat in the Hat specifically, and concluded The Cat 
NOT in the Hat! was a satire.209 
In determining whether Penguin was entitled to the fair use 
defense, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Campbell decision. 210 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court considered whether a rap 
group's use of a famous pop song was a fair one.211 The Court 
methodically explored each of the four factors set forth in § 107 
in light of the goals of copyright.212 The Campbell opinion pro-
vides the lower courts with guidance in determining whether a 
derivative work is a parody and whether it is entitled to the 
fair use defense.213 
205. See id. at 1406. 
206. 510 u.s. 569 (1994). Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music is the most recent prece-
dent for copyright infringement by an alleged parody. See id. 
207. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 3, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 580-83 (1994) (perceiving parody where secondary work targets original 
work, at least in part); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (perceiving 
parody where comedic objective of infringement was related to the original work). 
208. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 
(9th Cir. 1997) ("Seuss Ir). 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 1400. 
211. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569. 
212. See generally id. at 575-94. The Court did not actually conclude there had 
been fair use; instead, the case was remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 593-
94. 
213. See generally id. at 578-84. 
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By declaring The Cat NOT in the Hat! not a parody, the 
Ninth Circuit unnecessarily narrowed the Campbell holding.214 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court was willing to recognize that 
a work that more loosely targets the original may be suffi-
ciently aimed at the original to be a parody.215 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of Campbell set a precedent that is likely 
to have a chilling effect on the creation of social and political 
criticism.216 
In addition, under the first factor, the Ninth Circuit found 
no effort to create a trans formative work.217 Although, the 
court examined this subfactor, its analysis suggests that a de-
termination of whether the new work was transformative was 
dependent on whether the new work was a parody.218 As par-
ody is not the only category of work that may be considered 
transformative, the court should have clarified under what cir-
cumstances a new work will be sufficiently changed with new 
message, meaning or expression to constitute a transformative 
work.219 The court should also have presented an analysis re-
garding whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! superseded the 
original work.220 
After fmding that the first factor weighed against a finding 
of fair use, the court went on to evaluate the remaining 
factors. 221 While considering the second factor, the nature of 
the original copyrighted work, the court recognized that crea-
tive works, rather than factual works, are closer to the core of 
copyright protection.222 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit did not 
afford The Cat NOT in the Hat! any protection under this fac-
214. See SeusslI, 109 F.3d at 1401. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-82. 
215. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81, n.14. 
216. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 3, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). 
217. See Seussll, 109 F.3d at 1401. 
218. See id. at 1400-01. 
219. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
220. See generally SeusslI, 109 F.3d at 1399-1401. 
221. See id. at 1401-03. 
222. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; supra note 30, 91 and accompanying text. 
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tor because the original work embodied significant creativity, 
imagination and originality.223 
In examining the third factor, whether the quantity or 
quality of the appropriated material was reasonable, the court 
considered that the extent of copying allowed under fair use 
depends upon the derivative work's purpose.224 The court 
found that the heart, "the highly expressive core" of the origi-
nal, was taken and that this factor also weighed against a 
finding of fair use.225 The court's analysis, however, was influ-
enced by its earlier conclusion that the secondary use was not 
parody.226 
In considering the fourth factor, whether there was an ad-
verse effect on the market, the court inferred market harm be-
cause the secondary use was both non-transformative and 
commercia1.227 The court, however, failed to analyze the sub-
factors typically evaluated under an inquiry into the market 
effect.228 A proper inquiry examines: (1) the likelihood of sub-
stitution for the original; (2) the harm to derivatives unexcused 
by market failure; and (3) the harm to the original other than 
unremediable disparagement.229 The fair use doctrine strives 
to allow use of original material for the public's benefit, so long 
as that use does not interfere with the economic interests of the 
author.230 Had the court fully considered each of these subfac-
tors, it should have found that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was 
protected by fair use.231 
A. PERCEMNG A PARODY 
When considering a parodist's claim to fair use, a court 
must first determine if an infringer's work meets the threshold 
223. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
224. See id. at 1402-03. 
225. Id. 
226. See generally id. at 1401. 
227. See id. at 1403. 
228. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
229. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-92. 
230. See Dorsen, supra note 61, at 961. 
231. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94. 
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requirement for the defense: "whether a parodic character may 
reasonably be perceived. >7232 Courts have recognized parody as 
a work containing a discernible direct comment on the 
original.233 Although the Ninth Circuit conceded Penguin's 
work did broadly mimic Dr. Seuss' style, it concluded that the 
work was not a parody because The Cat NOT in the Hat! did 
not target the "substance" of the original work.234 
In analyzing whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! was a par-
ody, the Ninth Circuit presented the Campbell threshold test 
as if it intended to follow it.235 The Campbell Court would dis-
cern a parody when a new work could reasonably be perceived 
as having a parodic character and, at least, in part, comments 
on the prior author's works.236 The Ninth Circuit, however, 
elected to follow a stricter test outlined in Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence, which requires a parody to target the substance of 
the original as well as its general style.237 , The Ninth Circuit 
considered The Cat NOT in the Hat! to be merely a retelling of 
the O.J. Simpson saga with no direct comment on The Cat in 
the Hat. 238 On the basis that the infringing work did not mimic 
both the original's style and substance, the court found The Cat 
NOT in the Hat! to be merely a satire.239 Thus, The Cat NOT 
in the Hat! required justification for any borrowing because 
232. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582). 
233. See Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1569. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (finding rap ver-
sion of"Oh Pretty Woman" commented ,on the naivete of the original, which ignored the 
ugliness of street life); Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436. (finding parody in infringing song, 
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue," which mocked both the lyrics of "When Sunny Gets Blue; 
and the original singer's vocal range); Leibowitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. 
Supp. 1214, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding parodic effect achieved by contrasting majes-
tic pregnant woman and absurd-looking pregnant man); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l 
Broad. Co. 482 F. Supp. 741, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd 623 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1980) 
(finding parody in song, "I Love Sodom," that mocked original song, "I Love New York," 
and city's advertising campaign). 
234. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401. 
235. See id. at 1400. 
236. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580, 582. 
237. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597). 
238. See Suess II, 510 U.S. at 1401. 
239. See id. 
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satire does not share parody's protection under the fair use doc-
trine.240 
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Seuss Enterprises is not con-
sistent with the Campbell decision.241 In Campbell, a rap 
group substituted shocking lyrics for the original, "Oh, Pretty 
Woman," to show the banality of the Roy Orbison and William 
Dees song.242 The Supreme Court found that the rap song "jux-
tapose[d] the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes 
true, with degrading taunts, [and] a bawdy demand for sex.~43 
The Court accepted these taunts as commentary on the naivete 
of the original, which ignored the realities and ugliness of 
street life.244 Although the Supreme Court was unwilling to 
assign a high rank of parodic element to the rap song, it never-
theless recognized the song could reasonably be perceived as 
commenting to some degree on the origina1.245 
Similarities exist between the secondary works in Campbell 
and Seuss Enterprises.246 In both cases, the new works share a 
significant main character with the infringing work; the in-
truder in Seuss Enterprises and the "pretty woman" in Camp-
bell.247 In both instances, the copier took highly recognizable 
material to "conjure up" the target of their parody.248 The sec-
ondary works both commented on society and the naivete of the 
original work.249 Although The Cat in the Hat characterized 
240. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81. 
241. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 3, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; 
Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394. 
242. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (M.D. Tenn. 
1991) ("Acuff-Rose"). 
243. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
244. Seeid. 
245. See id. 
246. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; Seuss 11, 109 F.3d 1394. 
247. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1402; Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1155. 
248. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573; Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401. 
249. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583; Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. The 
authors of The Cat NOT in the Hat! suggest they relied on the original Seuss work in a 
way to expose the real trickster "cat", a.k.a. O.J. Simpson, who creates chaos and mi-
raculously cleans it up, "leaving a moral dilemma in its wake." See Seuss II, 109 F.3d 
at 1402-1403. In contrast, in Campbell, the Supreme Court recognized parody in the 
mockery of the simplicity of"Oh, Pretty Woman." See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 960. 
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the gullibility of the children and their mother and The Cat 
NOT in the Hat! characterized the dupability prevalent within 
the justice system, the Ninth Circuit rejected the idea that The 
Cat NOT in the Hat! commented on the naivete of the 
original. 250 
In both secondary works, there was a significant departure 
from the original in the content and storyline.251 For example, 
in Campbell, the emphasis was no longer on a "pretty woman," 
but instead on a "hairy woman," a "bald headed woman," and a 
"two timin' woman."252 Similarly, in Seuss Enterprises, the 
story diverged from mischief and general mayhem to murder 
and legal tricks.253 Just as the Supreme Court reasonably per-
ceived a parodic character for "Oh Pretty Woman" in Campbell, 
so could the Ninth Circuit have perceived such a character for 
The Cat NOT in the Hat! in Seuss Enterprises.254 
Despite Penguin's claim that its work was a commentary on 
the events surrounding the Brown/Goldman murders, the court 
found the infringing work was not a parody.255 Concededly, it 
250. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. Both books end with a dilemma about whether 
the truth shall be known. See id. For the ending of The Cat in the Hat, see supra note 
1 and accompanying text. The Cat NOT in the Hat! ends with the refrain: 
Hmm ... take the word JUICE. 
Then add ST. 
Between the U and I, you see. 
And then you have JUSTICE. 
Or maybe you don't. 
Maybe we will. 
And maybe we won't. 
Cause if the cat didn't do it? 
Then who? Then who? 
Was it him? 
Was it her? 
Was it me? 
Was it you? 
Ohme! Ohmy! 
Ohmy! Ohme! 
The murderer is running free. 
Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
251. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401; Campbell, 510 U.S. at Appendix A, B. 
252. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1155. 
253. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
254. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
255. See Seuss 11,109 F.3d at 1402-03. 
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is not sufficient to conclude a work is a parody based solely on 
the author's claim. An author's intent, however, should be 
taken into account.256 Here, the Ninth Circuit did not accept 
the authors' assertion that they selected The Cat in the Hat as 
the vehicle for their parody because of the similarities between 
the two stories.257 The authors argued that the two murder 
victims were surprised by O.J. Simpson, who committed acts 
contrary to moral authority.258 The authors pointed out the 
similarity to The Cat in the Hat's storyline, where the two chil-
dren were surprised by the Cat, who also committed acts con-
trary to moral authority.259 This connection could reasonably 
be perceived as targeting the substance of the origina1.260 
In addition, according to the authors, in The Cat NOT in the 
Hat!, a defense team of lawyers seemed to impose "tricks" on a 
largely unwilling public, much like Things One and Two im-
posed tricks on the unwilling children in The Cat in the Hat. 261 
The resulting verdict, acquitting O.J. Simpson, astonished a 
substantial segment of the public, just as The Cat in the Hat's 
readers are astonished after the children and the Cat get away 
with the mischief of the afternoon.262 This similarity could be 
reasonably perceived as targeting the substance, in addition to 
the style, of the origina1.263 Finally, the authors contended both 
books ended with a moral dilemma: whether the public would 
be told about the identity of the victims' visitor(s) and whether 
the mother would ever learn about the children's visitors.264 
Although the horror of what transpired in the Brown/Goldman 
murders is incomparable to the simple mischief that occurred 
in The Cat in the Hat, the court should have balanced the 
authors' intent, along with their success or lack thereof in 
256. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
257. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
258. See id. at 1402. 
259. See id. 
260. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. 
261. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. Public opinion on the verdict in the Simpson 
trial was sharply divided, often along racial and gender lines. See Mueller, supra note 
15, at 741. 
262. See Henry J. Reske, Verdict On Simpson Trial, 81 A.BA J. 48 (Nov. 1995). 
263. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-83. 
264. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
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creating a parody, and reasonably perceived a parodic charac-
ter.265 
Whether a parody is in good or bad taste should not affect 
the court's analysis.266 In reality, however, it may be a factor in 
reaching a decision on fair use. Frequently, when a parody at-
tacks a time-honored pop icon, or where an attack is sexually 
explicit, courts have found no fair use.267 Thus, a determina-
tion of no fair use is more likely when the parody is offensive 
and transgresses the accepted norms of taste and decency.268 A 
parody is often considered offensive "when there is a cultural 
gulf separating the maker and the object of the parody.Jtl69 In 
Campbell, the Court did not deny a finding of fair use despite 
the parody's explicit sexual language.27o The distinction may 
be that the pop song, u~h, Pretty Woman," is not as venerated, 
in the court's eyes, as classical children's characters, such as 
those found in the Disney and Seuss works.271 
In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, the defendants 
also targeted an adult audience by featuring well-known chil-
265. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
266. See id. at 582. 
267. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (finding raucous rap group's song taking 
off from romantic pop song is candidate for fair use defense because it may reasonably 
be perceived as a parody and at least, in part, comments on the original work); Seuss 
II, 109 F.3d 1394 (rejecting as social commentary on "trial of the century" for two bru-
tal and vicious murders using classic children's book character and not considering 
work a parody); Fisher, 794 F.2d 432 (finding raucous song relying on romantic pop 
song a parody); MeA v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2nd eir. 1981) (rejecting sexually explicit 
song based on pop song as parody); Elsmere Music Inc., 623 F.2d 252 (finding satiric 
skit performed to tune of public relation campaign parody); Walt Disney Productions v. 
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th eir. 1978) (finding sexually explicit portrayals of classic 
children's cartoon characters in counter culture comic book not fair use where copying 
was more exact than necessary for parodist's purposes). 
268. See supra note 267. 
269. Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1017. In making any subjective interpretation, 
such as whether a work constitutes a parody, the court is susceptible to making an 
aesthetic judgment, rather than a legal one, due to the "cultural gulf' in the relative 
perspectives of the court and the infringer. See generally id. at 1017-20. 
270. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582. 
271. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394; Air Pirates, 581 
F.2d at 753. In Air Pirates, the classic Disney characters were portrayed as promiscu-
ous, drug ingesting members of the counter culture. See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 752-
53. In Seuss Enterprises, the classic eat was portrayed as a murderer. See Seuss I, 
924 F. Supp. at 1561. 
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dren's characters.272 The court concluded that the Disney copy-
rights were infringed; however, the court based its legal con-
clusion solely on the rule that excessive copying precludes fair 
use, and not on a consideration of whether there was market 
harm.273 Theoretically, the new work created a potential nega-
tive market effect for the original by skewing the adult public's 
view.274 Although the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity in both 
Seuss Enterprises and Air Pirates to comment on the impact of 
such unremediable disparagement, neither opinion reflected 
such consideration.275 In either case, criticism would not be 
recognized as a cognizable harm under copyright law.276 
B. PARODY VERSUS SATIRE 
In contrast to satire, the fair use doctrine affords a parody 
greater latitude throughout the fair use analysis.277 For exam-
ple, the nature of the original copyrighted work would be con-
sidered less important because parody inevitably copies well-
known expressive works.278 The quantity and quality of an in-
fringer's appropriation would be evaluated on a sliding scale, 
depending on the degree to which the infringer's overriding 
purpose was to parody the origina1.279 Moreover, if the court 
recognized the infringing work as a parody, market harm 
would be unlikely since few authors grant permission to have 
their work ridiculed, even with financial consideration.280 Fi-
nally, given the transformative nature of a parody, a court 
would be less likely to infer market substitution and, therefore, 
less likely to conclude market harm had occurred.281 Thus, a 
finding of a parodic character under the first factor carries with 
272. See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 752-53. 
273. See id. at 751. 
274. See id. at 758. 
275. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394; Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751. 
276. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92. 
277. See id. at 579-81. 
278. See id. at 586. 
279. See id. at 588. 
280. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437-38. 
281. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. 
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it a certain amount of breathing space in a court's deliberations 
on the remaining factors.282 
Here, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the purpose of The 
Cat NOT in the Hat! was not parody, but satire, impacted the 
court's analysis under each of the remaining fair use factors.283 
Although the nature of the copyrighted work is typically not 
given much weight in a fair use analysis, it is even less impor-
tant in cases of parodic infringement, because "parodies almost 
invariably copy publicly known expressive works. ~84 Any pro-
tection a parody may have gained under the second factor was 
lost in Seuss Enterprises, even though the Ninth Circuit indi-
cated this factor would not be significant in the court's overall 
fair use analysis.285 
Despite considering this factor less significant in the fair 
use balancing, the court found that the degree of creativity and 
imagination embodied in The Cat in the Hat weighed against a 
finding of fair use.286 In Campbell, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that parody depends upon a recognition of the original's 
most distinctive or memorable features, which, more often than 
not, are the original's most creative expression.287 Thus, this 
factor becomes less important when considering the fair use 
defense in connection with a parody.288 Had the Ninth Circuit 
concluded under the first factor that the new work was a par-
ody, rather than a satire, then it may not have concluded that 
the second factor weighed against a finding of fair use.289 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's analysis under the third fac-
tor depended upon its conclusion under the first.290 Under the 
282. See id. at 578-94. 
283. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399-1403. The court reached this conclu-
sion because the infringer only targeted the style, and not the substance, of the original 
work. See id. at 1401. 
284. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
285. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
286. See id. 
287. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-88. 
288. See id. at 586. 
289. See generally id. 
290. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss1/5
1998] FAIR USE DEFENSE 37 
third factor, the inquiry is whether the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used, in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole, are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copy-
ing.291 The Ninth Circuit noted that Penguin appropriated the 
Cat's image multiple times, copying the Cat's hat and using the 
image on the front and back covers and thirteen times in the 
text.292 Regarding the qualitative nature of the infringement, 
the court found there was no doubt that the Cat's image repre-
sented the highly expressive core of Dr. Seuss' work.293 
When parody takes aim at a particular work, the parody 
must be able to "conjure up" enough of the original so the paro-
dist can be certain the audience will recognize it.294 Once 
enough has been appropriated to insure recognition, how much 
can be reasonably taken will depend on the degree to which the 
overriding purpose is to parody the original or to create a sub-
stitute for it.295 
Although there is no bright line rule for determining the 
amount necessary to conjure up an original, prior decisions 
provide guidance. In Leibowitz v. Paramount,296 the lower 
court found a parodic work that featured a smirking man's 
head atop a pregnant women's body constituted fair use.297 The 
"heart" of the original photograph featured a well-known ac-
tress, Demi Moore, pregnant, with an expression of fulfillment, 
serenity, and pride.298 When considering parody, the inquiry is 
not solely whether the "heart" of the original is taken, since it 
is the "heart" that ensures an audience will recognize an origi-
nal. 299 Although, in this case, the infringing work copied the 
"heart" of the original, incorporating Leibowitz's lighting and 
291. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
292. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
293. See id. 
294. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
295. See id. 
296. 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
297. See generally id. at 1215. 
298. See id. at 1222-24. 
299. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89. 
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backdrop, the court found the amount of copying was reason-
able because the overriding purpose was to parody the 
original. 300 
In The Cat NOT in the Hat!, the court emphasized that 
Penguin appropriated the Cat's stovepipe hat with five alter-
nating dark and light stripes.301 The characters, the Cat in the 
Hat and the caricature of O.J. Simpson, wear the striped hat 
and share similar expressions.302 Each character has a long 
neck, narrow shoulders, and a facial expression with upraised 
eyebrows and a closed lip smile.3°S Penguin elected to use a 
caricature of O.J. Simpson wearing the striped, stovepipe hat, 
only as frequently as necessary to insure identification of the 
prankish cat.304 The appropriation of the original in both Lei-
bowitz and Seuss Enterprises was merely sufficient to fulfill the 
parodic requirement of recognition.305 
In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit 
considered an infringement that asserted fair use of several 
Disney characters.3OO The Air Pirates comic book featured well-
known Disney characters as free-thinking, promiscuous, drug-
ingesting members of a counter culture.307 The Ninth Circuit 
identified three factors for determining whether the appropria-
tion was excessive: (1) the degree of public recognition of the 
original work, (2) the focus of the parody, and (3) the ease of 
conjuring up the original work.3°S The first two factors taken 
300. See Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1225. 
301. See Seu88 I, 924 F. Supp. at 1564. 
302. See id.; Defs.' Opening Br., at 14, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books 
USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). 
303. See Seu88 1,924 F. Supp. at 1564. 
304. See Defs.' Opening Brief, at 14, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619); Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1407-08, Attach-
ments 1, 2. 
305. See generally Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. 1225; Seus8 II, 109 F.3d 1394. In Leibo-
witz, there was a single image parodied with another single image. See Leibowitz, 948 
F. Supp. 1225. In Seu88 Enterprise8, Penguin appropriated the Cat's image thirteen 
times in the text, though not on every page, whereas the Cat appeared in nearly every 
illustration in The Cat in the Hat. See SeUS8 II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
306. See generally Air Pirate8, 581 F.2d at 753. 
307. See id. 
308. See Fisher, 794 F.3d at 439 (citing Air Pirate8, 581 F.2d at 757-58.) 
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together indicate that how much more copying is necessary for 
a successful claim of fair use depends on the degree to which 
the parody targets the origina1.309 In Air Pirates, the Ninth· 
Circuit found no· fair use, but solely because the copying had 
been more exact then necessary for the parodist's purpose.310 
The Ninth Circuit specifically commented that the Disney 
characters are well known to the public and a viable alterna-
tive to exact copying existed because a recognizable caricature 
would be relatively easy to draw.3ll 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish Air Pirates 
in its Seuss Enterprises opinion, the copying of the hat in Seuss 
Enterprises was not exact and more importantly, the stovepipe 
hat rests upon a caricature of O.J. Simpson, rather than atop a 
caricature of the Cat.312 Whereas the Ninth Circuit deemed the 
copying of the Disney characters to have no other purpose than 
to track Disney's work as closely as possible, in Seuss Enter-
prises, the illustrator made a bona-fide attempt to use only as 
much as was necessary to conjure up the origina1.313 The rele-
vant illustration in The Cat NOT in the Hat! is based on the 
original, but it is a caricature of O.J. Simpson.314 In balancing 
the scope of the copying with the degree of targeting the origi-
nal work, the court should have concluded that The Cat NOT in 
the Hat! was entitled to the fair use defense because it only ap-
propriated as much as necessary to ensure identification.315 
Another inquiry under the quality and quantity analysis is 
the persuasiveness of the parodist's justification for the 
taking.316 In accordance with Campbell, the Ninth Circuit 
"recognize[d] the extent of the permissible copying varies with 
the purpose and character of the use.'J317 In Campbell, both the 
309. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
310. See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758. 
311. See id. at 757-58. 
312. See supra note 304. 
313. See generally Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 757-58; Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1397. 
314. See supra note 304. 
315. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89. 
316. See id. at 586. 
317. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586). 
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original song and the infringing work focused on the physical 
attributes of their female main character.3lS The new song 
copied the opening lyrics and repeated one of its bass riffS.319 
Then, it departed markedly from the song's lyrics for its own 
purpose and included distinctive sounds, various noises, over-
laid solos in different keys, and a different drum beat.32o 
Similarly, in Seuss Enterprises, the new book copied the Cat's 
stovepipe hat, pose, and facial expression, and some of its po-
etic rhythm, but then departed markedly with the new content, 
retelling the story of an infamous double murder and the en-
suing trial.321 The Ninth Circuit could have found that the 
quantity and quality of the appropriated material were consis-
tent with the infringer's parodic intent.322 
C. TRANSFORMATIVE USE AS FAIR USE 
The Ninth Circuit also found Penguin's use of The Cat in the 
Hat non-transformative based on its conclusion that Penguin 
made no effort to incorporate "new expression, meaning, or 
message" into the secondary work.323 As a result, because 
market substitution was more certain, the court was willing to 
infer market harm under the fourth factor.324 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, in its failure to analyze what would constitute "new ex-
pression, meaning, or message," at the very least, missed an 
opportunity to clarify the nature of a transformative work. 
This consideration was important because if The Cat NOT in 
the Hat! was transform ative , the first factor may not have 
weighed against fair use, despite the commercial character of 
the infringing work.325 Additionally, market substitution 
would be less certain and market harm might have been less 
readily inferred.326 Consequently, had the Ninth Circuit con-
318. See generally Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1155. 
319. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589. 
320. See id. 
321. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402; Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1564. 
322. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 566-89. 
323. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401. 
324. See id. 
325. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
326 .. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
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cluded the new work was transformative, in a separate analy-
sis, it might not have concluded that the purpose, under the 
first factor, and the effect on the market, under the fourth fac-
tor, weighed against a finding of fair use.327 
The creation of transformative works furthers the goals of 
copyright.328 Some courts have required that a transformative 
use be productive and employ the original material in a differ-
ent manner or for a different purpose than the origina1.329 A 
new work may not supersede the function, and therefore the 
economic value, of the origina1.330 The majority of courts rec-
ognize a secondary work as a transformative work when suffi-
cient new expression, meaning, or message has been added to 
the origina1.331 Transformative works may quote the original 
in a criticism of that work, expose a character from the origi-
nal, or summarize an idea in order to either defend. or rebut 
that notion.332 In the instant case, Penguin may have exposed 
the Cat.333 
Although a transformative use is not a prerequisite to the 
fair use defense, transformative works lie at the heart of the 
doctrine's guarantee of protection for secondary works.334 New 
works enrich society by adding value to the original work 
through "new aesthetics, insights, and understandings. n335 
327. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. The four statutory factors may not be 
treated in isolation and each factor is to be analyzed independently, although the re-
sults must be weighed together in light of the goals of copyright. See id. 
328. See id. at 579. 
329. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1111. This approach was 
adopted by the dissenters in Sony v. Universal, but rejected by the majority of the 
Supreme Court. See id. at 1111 n.29. 
330. See id. at 1111. 
331. See Seu88 II, 109 F. 3d at 1400. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
332. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1111. Transformative 
uses may also include "parody, symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable 
other uses." Id. 
333. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. 
334. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The doctrine of fair use provides for 
copying without permission under certain circumstances, as when the work was copied 
to create a new work that performs a substantially different function than the original. 
See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 962-63. 
335. Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1001. 
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Originality, however, is a prerequisite to copyrightability.336 
Therefore, an important inquiry under the first factor is 
whether the new work is transformative, an original 
creation.337 On a sliding scale, the more transformative the 
secondary work, the less significant are other subfactors, like a 
commercial nature, under a purpose and character analysis.338 
Generally, a parody is considered transformative, although a 
transformative work need not be a parody.339 
When considering whether an infringing work is transfor-
mative, it is helpful to look to the issues presented in claims of 
copyrightability for derivative works.340 The threshold for 
copyrightability of a derivative work incorporates an originality 
requirement.341 The Copyright Act affords limited copyright 
protection to derivative works, specifically by only recognizing 
the contribution distinguishable from the original work.342 To 
support an application for a copyright to a derivative work, the 
originality within a derivative work must be more than 
trivial.343 Analogous to the fair use analysis of effect on the 
market, the derivative work cannot affect the scope of the copy-
right protection afforded to the preexisting material.344 
Id. 
336. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
337. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
338. See id. 
339. See generally id. 
340. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1996). Section 103(b) states: 
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the 
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from 
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any 
exclusive tight in the preexisting material. The copyright in such a 
work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, dura-
tion, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the pre-
existing material. 
341. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). "A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which the work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted." Id. 
342. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b); supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
343. See Durham Ind., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F. 2d 905, 909 (2nd Cir. 1980). See 
generally Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 
F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997). 
344. See Durham, 630 F. 2d at 909. 
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The Ninth Circuit considered whether the original aspects 
of the secondary work were sufficient in Doran v. Sunset House 
Distributing COrp.345 In Doran, the court noted that a copy-
rightable derivative work may be created by the original 
author's own skill, labor, and judgment,' resulting in a contribu-
tion recognizably original to the prior treatment.346 Originality 
means both that the particular work owes its origin to the 
author and a modicum of creativity is embodied in the new 
work.347 In Seuss Enterprises, the additions and modifications 
made by the authors of The Cat NOT in the Hat! were creative 
and anything but trivial.348 Although· the authors were in-
spired by The Cat in the Hat, they added new meaning to the 
story of the mischievous Cat by recasting him in the role of the 
"murderous" O.J. Simpson.349 On its face, The Cat NOT in the 
Hat! has sufficient originality to satisfy this threshold prereq-
uisite for copyrightability of a derivative work.350 
The Ninth Circuit cut short its analysis, or at least any 
presentation of its deliberations, regarding whether The Cat 
NOT in the Hat! was transformative.351 The court did not ex-
plain how the new work failed to incorporate original expres-
sion, meaning, or message.352 The court also failed to indicate 
how this new work would have superseded the original work.353 
A full consideration of these subfactors under the analysis of 
purpose would have led the court to recognize the new work as 
transformative.354 As a transformative work, The Cat NOT in 
345. 197 F.Supp. 940, 943-44 (S.D. Cal. 1961), af/'d Sunset House Distributing 
Corp. v. Doran, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962). 
346. See Doran, 197 F. Supp. at 944-45. 
347. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,362-63 
(1991). 
348. See generally Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 140l. 
349. See id. 
350. See id. 
351. See generally id. at 1399-1401. 
352. See id. 
353. See generally SeUS8 II, 109 F.3d at 1399-1401. 
354. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-82. 
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the Hat! could have been considered a fair use, after a full ex-
amination of the other statutory factors.355 
D. THE IMPoRTANT FOURTH FACTOR: EFFECT ON THE MARKET 
The Ninth Circuit's decision contains a surprisingly brief 
analysis of the important fourth factor: effect on the market.31l6 
Based on the facts presented, the court is required to consider 
each of the enumerated factors, weighed together, in light of 
the goals of copyright.357 In addressing the fourth factor spe-
cifically, it is critical that the court's deliberation include an 
examination of the economic consequences of the copying, such 
as the failure to pay the customary price, market substitution, 
and unremediable disparagement.358 
With regard to failure to pay the customary price, the Ninth 
Circuit failed to address the issue of market failure.359 Market 
failure occurs when the infringer, spec~cally a parodist, can 
not appropriately purchase its desired use through the 
market.360 It is unlikely that an author will license a derivative 
work that ridicules the original work or its style.361 Without a 
chance that such a derivative work would be licensed, poten-
tially-beneficial works would not reach the public, thus frus-
trating the goals of copyright and fair use.362 In this case, 
Seuss Enterprises would have denied Penguin's use, thus trig-
gering market failure.363 
355. See generally id. at 578-79. 
356. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94. 
357. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (citing Toward A Fair Use, supra note 25, at 
1110-11). 
358. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94. 
359. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403; supra note 201 and accompanying 
text. 
360. See Gordon, supra note 132, at 1632-34. An infringer is not required to inquire 
about a license from the author of the original work, but the court does not discourage 
such requests. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437. 
361. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437. 
362. See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1012-13. 
363. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 12, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). Seuss Enterprises was on record as 
unwilling to license a parodic use for The Cat NOT in the Hat! See id. In Fisher, de-
fendant requested permission and was denied. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437. In Camp-
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Even though the court found The Cat NOT in the Hat! non-
transformative, the court should have independently inquired 
into whether market substitution was likely.364 In Leibowitz v. 
Paramount,365 where the infringing work was recognized as a 
parody, the court noted the unlikelihood that a consumer in the 
market for a serious photograph commenting on the beauty of 
pregnancy would satisfy her demand with a slapstick photo-
graph of a smirking man's head atop a pregnant woman's 
body.366 
In Fisher v. Dees, the Ninth Circuit compared two equally 
incongruous works, the original romantic, nostalgic ballad and 
the 29-second new recording, about a glue-sniffing woman, that 
ends in noise and laughter.367 The court did not believe that 
consumers would be equally satisfied by a purchase of either 
one or the other.368 Instead, it concluded that the works did not 
fulfill the same demand and therefore the new work had no 
cognizable effect on the origina1.369 
In Seuss Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish 
its earlier Fisher decision.37o Even a superficial analysis shows 
that market substitution in Seuss Enterprises was, virtually 
non-existent given the market segment the infringers 
targeted.371 Penguin's market consisted of adults with a maca-
bre sense of humor, whereas Dr. Seuss' target market consists 
of children and parents who cherish the classic tale of The Cat 
in the Hat.372 The books would be displayed in different sec-
tions in bookstores, The Cat NOT in the Hat! in the humor sec-
tion and The Cat in the Hat in the children's early reader sec-
bell, the defendants requested permission and were denied. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at, 
572-73. 
364. See generally CampbeU, 510 U.S. at 578. 
365. 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
366. See Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1226. 
367. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438. 
368. Seeid. 
369. Seeid. 
370. See generally Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
371. See generally Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438; Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1226. 
372. See generally Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1396-97; Defs.' Pet. for Reb'g, at 13, Dr. 
Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th eir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). 
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tion, thereby minimizing any competition.373 The Cat NOT in 
the Hat!, like "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," could not be a market 
substitute for the original. 374 
In Seuss Enterprises, the court failed to consider that Pen-
guin's work was adult-oriented humor replete with new expres-
sion, meaning and message, entirely different from the original 
work.375 One could hardly imagine a transformation more dis-
tinguishable from the original, aimed at an entirely different 
audience.37s The subject matter of the original deals with the 
ordinary pranks of childhood.377 In contrast, The Cat NOT in 
the Hat! deals with the sophisticated nuances of our justice sys-
tem through the retelling of a horrific double murder and the 
ensuing public trial.37S Although the new work borrows from 
the original to establish its main character as a trickster "Cat," 
it moves on to new ground and arguably transforms the origi-
nal.379 As in Leibowitz, it is equally unlikely that a consumer 
in search of bedtime reading for a young child would fulfill that 
demand with a dark, comedic retelling of a double murder.380 
In Seuss Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit should have analyzed 
the issue of consumer substitution and found that The Cat 
NOT in the Hat! is not a suitable market substitute for the 
original. 381 
Market substitution may also be avoided by a minimal dis-
tribution of the new work in the market or if the infringer only 
373. See Defs.' Pet. For Reh'g, at 13, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). 
374. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438. 
375. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 10, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). See generally Seuss II, 109 F. 3d at 1399-
1401. 
376. See generally Fisher, 794 F.2d 432; Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. 1225. 
377. See generally DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT (Random House 1957). 
378. See generally SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402-03. 
379. Seeid. 
380. See generally Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp at 1226. . 
381. See generally Fisher, 794 F.2d 432; Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. 1225. The Ninth 
Circuit simply concluded market substitution on the basis of the former conclusion that 
The Cat NOT in the Hat! was both non-transformative and commercial. See Seuss II, 
109 F.3d at 1403. 
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borrows a small amount from the origina1.382 The planned dis-
tribution of the new work was only 12,000 copies, a minimal 
distribution in the book publishing industry and a fraction of 
Dr. Seuss' worldwide sales of 35 million books.383 When con-
sidering the amount borrowed, after the parodist conjures up 
the original, how much more can be taken depends on whether 
and to what degree the purpose of the new work is to parody 
the origina1.384 Consequently, the issue of whether the parodist 
could have taken less and still accomplished the parody be-
comes a relative consideration under this inquiry.385 In The 
Cat NOT in the Hat!, the illustrator's choice to caricature O.J. 
Simpson in the Cat's hat, expression, and pose, rather than 
copy the Cat itself, suggests that the new work borrowed a 
small amount from the original, just enough to conjure it Up.386 
The Ninth Circuit also looked to the Second Circuit's hold-
ing in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson387 for guidance .in balancing the 
benefit to the public if the infringing use were permitted, and 
the projected personal gain of the copyright owner if the use 
was denied.386 In MCA, the Second Circuit pointed out that the 
less adverse the effect on the copyright owner's expected gain, 
the lower the need to show public benefit to justify the use.389 
AB the Ninth Circuit was willing to infer market harm because 
Penguin's use of the original was non-transformative and 
commercial, it was presumably more concerned about the po-
tential gain to the copyright holder if the use was denied.390 
There was effectively no adverse effect for the court to consider, 
however, since the copyright holders had gone on record as un-
willing to license a parodic use, such as Penguin intended.391 
382. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81 n.14. 
383. See Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1396-97. 
384. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89. 
385. Seeid. 
386. See supra note 304. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89. 
387. 677 F.2d 180 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
388. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403 (citing MCA, 677 F.2d at 183). 
389. See MCA, 677 F.2d at 183. 
390. See generally Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
391. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 12, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). 
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Although the court considered the effect on Seuss' substantial 
good will and reputation, such harm may fall under the cate-
gory of unremediable disparagement, a non-cognizable harm 
under copyright law.392 While it is arguable that a parodic 
treatment of the O.J. Simpson trial would produce a public 
benefit, that issue should not have been dispositive in this 
case.393 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Parody, one of the oldest forms of literature, has proven to 
be a potent form of social commentary and thus a powerful 
force in society.394 In keeping with the goals of copyright, par-
ody enriches society by its very nature.395 Having exhausted its 
legal avenues, Penguin's parody, The Cat NOT in the Hat!, was 
banned from pUblication.396 In addition to depriving the public 
of The Cat NOT in the Hat!, the court's prohibition of the book's 
publication sets a precedent that negatively impacts the efforts 
of future parodists.397 Where the court's application of fair use 
is not well understood and predictable, those that invest capital 
in distributing creative works become extremely wary.398 In 
fear of a similar disposition, conservative publishers may rely 
on the Ninth Circuit's more restrictive reasoning.399 As a result 
392. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1403; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. The associated 
goodwill of a trademark is relevant under a trade dilution claim when considering 
whether a trademark used in an unwholesome context has been tarnished. Keller &: 
Bernstein, supra note 17, at 1173. In Seuss Enterprises, the lower court had already 
determined there was minimal likelihood of success on a federal dilution claim. See 
Seuss11, 109 F.3d at 1397. 
393. See generally Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52; Piele, supra note 67, at 98. 
394. See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 960-62. 
395. See id. 
396. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th 
Cir. 1997) ("Seuss 11"). Penguin's petition for rehearing, tiled on April 17, 1997, was 
denied by the Ninth Circuit. See Defs.' Pet. For Reh'g, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Pen-
guin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). Subsequently, Pen-
guin's petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied. See Dr. Seuss En-
ter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 
U.S.L.W.3170 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1997) (No. 97-329). 
397. See generally Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, supra note 42, at 19-23; 
Piele, supra note 67, at 100. 
398. See generally Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, supra note 42, at 21-22. 
399. See id. 
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of the chilling effect of uncertainty, a publisher may elect not to 
publish what it believes to be a parodic work, out of fear that 
the reviewing court will find the work a satire, rather than a 
parody.4°O Such an effect deprives the public of social commen-
tary and defies the goals of copyright; to encourage authors to 
create works that ultimately benefit society.401 
400; Seem. 
401. See id. 
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